Team Resource Management (TRM): A Tavistock approach to leadership in high-risk environments by Fraher, Amy L.
Team Resource Management (TRM): A
Tavistock Approach to Leadership in 
High-Risk Environments1
Resonances of 9/11
Amy L. Fraher*
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to build upon the study of organizational disaster
by analysing essential elements of a new team training model called Team
Resource Management (TRM). Reviewing the history and methods of Crew
Resource Management (CRM), a popular aviation training programme that
has spread to other high-risk, high-hazard industries, the article considers its
roots in American sensitivity training and identifies a need for a Tavistock-
based approach to team training. The article argues that effective leadership
training for teams operating in high-risk environments depends on develop-
ing events that can foster an examination of authority issues, illuminating both
overt and covert group processes that can impede decision-making, and pro-
poses seven guideposts to assist in programme development.
Interest in the psychoanalytic study of organizational disaster with a
particular focus on analysing factors that lead to performance break-
down, accident and death in high-risk industries has been growing.
Examples include analysis of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) (Schwartz, 1987, 1989; Stein, 2004), the Three
Mile Island nuclear reactor (Stein, 2004), a 1996 Mount Everest climb-
ing expedition (Kayes, 2004) and the Mann Gulch Fire (Wieck, 1993;
1995).
Prior to these studies Schwartz (1989) noted that explanations of dis-
asters often assumed the critical incident resulted from a single flawed
decision. In this view a disaster was ‘an aberration, an unfortunate
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accident – as much a tragedy for the well-meaning and generally com-
petent individuals [italics added] who made the decision as for its more
direct victims’ (ibid., p. 319). Analysis focused almost exclusively on
individual errors while training aimed to mitigate the reoccurrence of
these individual failures through repetition.
Little research at the time considered the influence of group dyna-
mics or systemic factors on team performance prior to or during the
disaster period. Recent research has shifted to consider these elements
revealing, as Kayes (2004) observed, that disasters are often preceded
by a ‘breakdown of team learning’ (p. 1264, italics added) in response
to anxieties created by changes in the environment.
In other words, disasters resulted from a team’s failure to sense the
severity of an impending problem, surface conflicts and discuss errors
creating obstacles to environmental adaptation and team learning. By
contrast, team learning is fostered when the team can tolerate ambigu-
ity and a state of not knowing as information reveals itself over time,
analyse and learn from experience, and discuss conflicts and errors in
a timely fashion.
How teams, in general, and leaders, in particular, respond to anxi-
ety and what Stein (2004) called the ‘critical period’ (p. 1244) as the
disaster unfolds is pivotal to the team’s learning process. Although a
wide variety of organizations increasingly rely on teams and
‘researchers know that muddled team process often leads to disas-
trous consequence’ (Kayes, 2004, p. 1263), little has been written about
methods of prevention or the training process by which teams might
avoid these unfortunate pitfalls.
This essay attempts to fill this gap. In particular, I argue that effec-
tive leadership training for teams operating in high-risk environments
depends on developing programmes that can foster an examination of
authority issues, illuminating both overt and covert group processes
that can impede decision-making, often in fatal ways. Reviewing the
history of existing models, the essay identifies a need for a Tavistock-
based approach to team training and offers seven guideposts for
programme development.
A NEW OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
Effective leadership requires more than vision, charisma and take-
charge decisiveness. To be successful, today’s leaders need to under-
stand systems psychodynamics or the individual, group and systemic
influences that shape decision-making (Fraher, 2004a, 2004c, Gould,
Stapley and Stein, 2001; Miller, 1993; Miller and Rice, 1967). Even
technical and professional fields once strictly guided by licensing,
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qualifications and regulations, such as aviation, automotive, fire fight-
ers, law enforcement, medicine, military, and nuclear power, have
been challenged to become more flexible and collaborative than ever
before. Many recent studies (Fin, 1995; Fraher, 2004a; Kern 2001;
Krause, 2003; Mearns et al., 2001; Salas et al., 2001; Weiner et al., 1993)
provide evidence from ‘a number of high-hazard, high-reliability
industries showing how failures of communication, poor teamwork
and poor leadership are common human factors precursors to acci-
dents’ (Mearns et al., p. 378).
Without exception, industry experts describe the post-9/11 world as
a new operating environment increasing demands for better communi-
cation, team-building expertise and peer mentoring capacity. For
example, 9/11 in New York taught us that law enforcement teams
need to collaborate with fire fighters, ambulance paramedics, politi-
cians, and emergency response teams within the transportation sys-
tem. On 7/7 in London, we saw excellent examples of this increased
collaboration. As a result, both casualties and chaos were contained.
Since 7/7, police chiefs from around the US have been working to
create ‘an informal network’ for more ‘rapid communication . . . They
[also] hope to work with police forces in Europe, the Middle East and
Asia to share information’ (Broder, 2005, p. A12). This new operating
environment requires knowledge and skills beyond the technical ones
traditionally taught in professional programmes. To succeed, it is no
longer enough to achieve technical competence; one must develop the
awareness, skills, and behaviours necessary for safe and efficient oper-
ation in today’s increasingly dynamic environments. This new, more
present leadership model would support leaders who can communi-
cate across many different boundaries, manage themselves in multiple
roles, and hone reflective capabilities using what has been called emo-
tional intelligence to inform actions. Such leaders would understand
how authority dynamics affect formal and informal leadership roles
and be better able to manage resistance to change.
In fact, research has shown that ‘in leadership positions, almost 90
percent of the competencies necessary for success are social and emo-
tional in nature’ (Cherniss, 2000, p. 434). Emotional intelligence skills
such as the ability to stay motivated, face frustration, control impulses,
manage anxiety and ‘keep distress from swamping the ability to think’
(Goleman, 1995, p. 34) become critical to decision-making under con-
ditions of stress. Goleman claimed that these skills ‘can be as power-
ful, and at times more powerful, than IQ’ as a determinant of
successful job performance (p. 34).
Yet, emotional intelligence largely has been overlooked in leader-
ship and team training. Once ‘considered an oxymoron by some’
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because ‘emotions convey the idea of unreasonableness,’ (Mayer et al.,
2000, p. 93) new brain research reveals the emotional and cognitive
centres of the brain to be far more integrated than previously thought.
And, important for development of new team training, Goleman
(1995) noted these ‘crucial emotional competencies can indeed be
learned’ (p. 34.).
Understanding the emotional intelligence of a group’s leader as not
simply an individual’s leadership characteristic; Cherniss (2000)
emphasized that it has ‘a powerful impact on the group’s climate and
effectiveness’ (p. 450, italics added). Although the leader and group
share this powerfully interdependent relationship, ‘the emotionally
intelligent leader is aware of these influences’, understands ‘group,
intergroup and organizational dynamics, particularly as they affect
emotional functioning, and [is] skillful in working with those dynam-
ics’ (p. 450). As a result, even leaders in highly specialized and techni-
cal fields can – and should – develop skills of observation, analysis and
reflection in order to increase their job performance.
Exploring how professionals in high-risk fields might increase their
awareness of the interdependent nature of groups and learn to man-
age anxiety in order to continue thinking and functioning in stressful
situations has not been undertaken until recently. One team training
model called Crew Resource Management (CRM) emerged twenty
years ago in the field of aviation and has proved popular, spreading
to other technical fields. Its persistence warrants further consideration.
Yet, as I will demonstrate in the following brief history, early CRM
models relied too heavily on changing individual behaviour without
increasing awareness of group and systemic dynamics, which ulti-
mately limited its usefulness. In order to meet the needs I have iden-
tified, a new team training approach is required.
AN EXISTING MODEL: THE ROOTS OF CREW RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT (CRM)
Human error and accidents
Initially termed Cockpit Resource Management, CRM emerged largely
as a bi-product of the Jet Age, morphing into Crew Resource Manage-
ment when flight attendants, dispatchers and aircraft mechanics
joined pilots in the training. As jet aircraft became the mainstay of
commercial air travel in the 1960s, the safety and reliability of jet
engines drastically reduced both maintenance problems and the num-
ber of aviation accidents, illuminating the fact that human errors
played a part in 70–80% of aircraft mishaps. ‘The conclusion drawn
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from these investigations was that “pilot error” in documented acci-
dents and incidents was more likely to reflect failures in team com-
munication and coordination than deficiencies in “stick-and-rudder”
proficiency’ (Helmreich and Foushee, 1993, p. 7).
In other words, misunderstandings and miscommunication
between crew inside the aircraft, often compounded by those with oth-
ers outside the cockpit, were a factor in nearly all aircraft accidents. Yet,
effecting cultural change would prove daunting, as aviation’s roots in
individual measurements of performance proved firmly embedded.
Entrenched ethos: individual proficiency
Perhaps influenced by the bravado of war fighting and barn-storming
in the early twentieth century, aviation culture historically has cele-
brated the courageous young dare-devil pilot and his individual fly-
ing acumen; rarely, if ever, has it lauded teamwork. Pilot training,
whether conducted in military, commercial or general aviation arenas,
often was accomplished one-on-one in boot camp fashion, where flight
instructors demonstrated and students unquestioningly mimicked
behaviour and technical manoeuvres under a barrage of verbal direc-
tion. There were few standardized methods of instruction and
‘communication between the instructor and student was woefully
inadequate, consisting mostly of shouting above the wind and engine
noise’ (Brady, 2000, p. 22). The goal – and first major achievement in
any pilot’s career – was to fly solo.
Even at major commercial airlines, until very recently, a pilot was
deemed competent when he or she could demonstrate proficiency in
flying a standard set of manoeuvres. Although pilots usually fly in
crews, competence had little to do with teamwork or error manage-
ment in the cockpit. It is ‘only within the last decade’ that we have
‘begun to consider this issue of crews and groups . . . in the training of
teams that fly commercial aircraft’ (Ginnett, 1993, p. 72).
The vast majority of airline pilots have been military trained. In
addition, in the US, most of the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) inspectors who, in coordination with airline leaders, developed
the training, checking, and standard operating practices were also
from a military background. A homogenous group, these ex-military
pilots created a culture to which they were accustomed. This culture
respected rank and authority, valuing captains who took charge and
acted decisively and subordinates who followed orders, rarely ques-
tioning authority or the decisions of superiors.
Reflecting these values, industry leaders developed a training envi-
ronment that measured ‘individual proficiency’ by requiring ‘each
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captain to demonstrate the ability to handle’ without assistance ‘nearly
every conceivable situation that might be encountered in flight’
(Birnbach and Longridge, 1993, p. 265). Called first officers, copilots’
individual proficiency was measured by how well they assisted the
captain. In fact, Helmreich and Foushee, (1993) noted ‘in 1952 the
guidelines for proficiency checks at one major airline categorically
stated that the first officer should not correct errors made by the captain’
(italics added, p. 5). The individualistic norms underpinning aviation
culture today continue to reflect this early acculturation process,
despite the fact that the history of aviation accidents suggests that
error management depends on recognizing how authority relations
can interfere with decision-making.
A case study: Florida Everglades
One aircraft accident that attracted the attention of aviation industry
leaders in 1972 and illuminated deficiencies in team training practices
was Eastern Airlines 401. A Lockheed L-1011, Flight 401 crashed in the
Florida Everglades fatally injuring ninety-nine passengers and five
crew members after an experienced aircrew became distracted by a
burnt out landing gear light bulb. Unbeknown to the crew, the aero-
plane began a slow descent after a newly installed autopilot was inad-
vertently disconnected during their trouble-shooting.
Upon investigation, the Safety Board found that many pilots inter-
viewed did not fully understand the autopilot’s features and ‘were
unaware of the minor control column inputs needed to effect a change
in the aircraft’s attitude’ (Krause, 2003, p. 138). Air Traffic Controllers
(ATC) compounded the communication and performance breakdown
within the cockpit by their vague inquiry – ‘How’s it goin’ out there,
Eastern?’ – when they observed the aircraft had departed its assigned
altitude on a steady descent to impact.
How had a highly trained, professional aircrew team in a modern,
well-equipped jet crash their plane over a ‘59-cent’ light bulb? And
why did ATC not inquire more specifically about the plane’s descent,
taking up their authority to challenge the aircrew’s violation of Federal
Aviation Regulations by departing from its assigned altitude without
clearance? And why had the pilots not been properly trained on the
new autopilot system? It became evident that individual, group and
systemic factors were all involved in the accident’s evolution.
By the mid-1970s many research studies, including several at
NASA, examined the human factors behind aviation accidents.
Between 1968 and 1976, George Cooper and Maury White conducted
a detailed analysis of commercial jet accidents worldwide, concluding
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that most incidents were correlated with ‘various failures of com-
mand, communication, and crew coordination’ (Weiner et al., 1993, 
p. xvii). Ruffell Smith’s (1979) research was even more specific, citing
a need for increased awareness about the role of management skills in
cockpit operations. Although these studies heightened awareness of
core issues, it was an incident in the Canary Islands that further
revealed the complex interrelatedness of authority relations and acci-
dents, providing an industry wide impetus to develop new team train-
ing methods.
A case study: Tenerife
On March 27, 1977 the most deadly aircraft collision in history
occurred at Los Rodeos Airport, Tenerife when KLM-Royal Dutch
Airlines Flight 4805 collided with Pan American Flight 1736 killing 583
passengers and crew. Both 747s had diverted to the tiny mountainous
airport due to bomb threats at their destination, Las Palmas. The
weather was overcast and foggy upon arrival and steadily deterio-
rated as the two large jets loitered around the confines of the single
runway, waiting for their destination to reopen.
As Chief Training Captain for the 747 fleet, the KLM captain was
very experienced and routinely featured in company advertisements.
His copilot was also an experienced pilot, but brand new to the 747. In
fact, the captain had recently given him his 747 checkride.
The Spanish air traffic controllers had difficulty communicating in
English and, exacerbated by the Dutch copilot’s non-standard phrase-
ology, there were numerous misunderstandings. After a lengthy
delay, Las Palmas reopened and the two jumbo jets attempted to
manoeuvre for takeoff within the limits of the small airport.
KLM taxied down the foggy runway first, turning 180° into position
for takeoff. Unbeknown to the eager Dutch captain, Pan Am was taxi-
ing immediately up the runway behind them. As the KLM captain
began the takeoff roll the copilot exclaimed ‘Wait a minute, we don’t
have an ATC clearance.’ The captain braked, responding ‘No . . . I
know that. Go ahead and ask.’ Dutifully, the copilot asked for takeoff
clearance and was told to ‘standby for takeoff.’
Nevertheless, the eager KLM captain said ‘Let’s go’ and initiated his
takeoff again. The copilot, clearly alarmed, exclaimed meaninglessly
over the radio ‘We are now at takeoff!’ further confusing communica-
tions between Pan Am and ATC.
The fog was so thick, neither ATC nor the taxiing Pan Am crew
could see the end of the runway or KLM accelerating down it. Seconds
later the Pan Am crew identified KLM’s lights coming out of the fog
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and frantically attempted to clear the runway as the KLM captain
rotated, forcing the jet into flight. Although KLM’s nose gear passed
over the other 747, the main landing gear sheared off Pan Am’s upper
deck and both aircraft were destroyed by fire.
Accident investigators determined that poor communication and
use of non-standard terminology were the main causes of the collision
and resultant deaths. Perhaps even more importantly, analysts won-
dered why such an experienced KLM crew could make such a basic,
yet catastrophic, mistake. Why was the KLM captain so reluctant to
accept input and why did the copilot, who clearly knew they had not
been issued takeoff clearance, not speak up more assertively to pre-
vent this accident?
In a break with aviation tradition novel for 1977, ‘safety analysts
believed it was possible that the first officer, who had only 95 hours in
the 747, and who was flying with the KLM chief 747 instructor, may
have been intimidated by the captain’s legendary status’ (italics added;
Krause, 2003, p. 210) In other words, it was an authority issue: the com-
bination of the captain’s impressive persona and the copilot’s lack of
confidence flying a new aeroplane resulted in an experienced copilot
becoming confused, questioning his sense-making capabilities. Was
this example of the powerful influence of authority dynamics over
human behaviour an anomaly? History proves otherwise.
A case study: Portland, Oregon
A third stunning breakdown in crew coordination, also compounded
by authority issues, occurred just a year and a half later when a United
Airlines DC-8 ran out of fuel six miles from its destination. Although
the copilot and flight engineer attempted to draw attention to the air-
craft’s dangerously low fuel state, the highly experienced and author-
itarian captain pushed forward his agenda, paying little attention to
the growing concerns of his crew.
On December 28, 1978 United Flight 173 lowered the landing gear
for arrival in Portland, Oregon and the crew observed an unsafe land-
ing gear indication followed by a loud thump, abnormal vibration and
aircraft yaw. Although the backup systems indicated that the gear was
in fact safely down and locked properly, the captain requested a hold-
ing pattern to communicate with company maintenance, dispatch, and
destination operations about the aircraft’s status.
The captain grew increasingly fixated on the chance that the gear
might collapse on landing, igniting onboard fuel supplies. As a result,
he delayed landing for almost an hour as he coordinated with flight
attendants for a possible emergency evacuation on touchdown. The
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captain became so distracted by these self assigned tasks, when the
copilot informed him the first of their four engines would soon fail the
captain inquired ‘Why?’ As first one engine then another dropped off
due to fuel starvation, the captain finally recognized the severity of the
situation demanding ‘You gotta keep ’em running . . .’ and the flight
engineer dutifully replied ‘Yes, sir.’
The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the prob-
able cause of the accident was not only the captain’s failure to moni-
tor and respond to the aircraft’s low fuel state but also the failure of
the first officer and flight engineer to make him aware of the severity
of the situation. Although the Board recognized that ‘the stature of a
captain and his management style may exert subtle pressure on his
crew to conform to his way of thinking and may hinder interaction
and adequate monitoring, forcing another crewmember to yield his
right to express an opinion’ they concluded that the other aircrew
were also culpable, exemplifying a ‘recurring problem’ (NTSB Report
DCA79AA005, 1978). As a result, the Board recommended the devel-
opment of an assertiveness training programme for all airline cockpit
and cabin crew members as part of a standard curriculum.
The emergence of aircrew training programmes: Blake, Mouton and NTL
In less than six years, almost seven hundred people had been need-
lessly killed in aviation accidents, hundreds more seriously injured, all
involving aircrew error and US air carriers. Industry leaders knew
they desperately needed a new team training model that could
address aviation’s entrenched ethos and the complex authority dyna-
mics of teams operating in stressful environments.
The first CRM workshop was held in 1979, sponsored by NASA,
and entitled Resource Management on the Flightdeck. Workshop discus-
sants agreed that failures of ‘interpersonal communications, decision-
making, and leadership’ (Helmreich al., 1999, p. 19) in particular, were
underlying factors in the majority of air crashes to date and training
was required. United Airlines took the lead, developing the first com-
prehensive CRM programme in 1981 (Cook, 1995).
Heavily influenced by the thinking of Robert Blake, an early
National Training Laboratories (NTL) enthusiast,2 and his cofounder
of Scientific Methods Inc., Jane Mouton, United’s training was based
on popular management efficiency programmes which had been
implemented successfully in a number of major US corporations in the
1970s. Entitled Command/Leadership/Resource Management (C/L/R),
United’s programme ‘emphasized changing individual styles and cor-
recting deficiencies in individual [italics added] behavior such as a lack
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of assertiveness by juniors and authoritarian behavior by captains’
(Helmreich et al., p. 20).
The centerpiece of Blake and Mouton’s (1964) training approach was
the now famous Managerial Grid, in which participants were asked to
respond to a series of survey questions designed to elicit attitudes
towards task and people. For instance, a person with low concern for
task accomplishment but high concern for people had a country club
leadership style. A person with high concern for task accomplishment
but low concern for people was considered to have an authoritarian
leadership style. The training was intended to provide opportunity for
participants to reflect on their personal managerial styles and consider
how others may perceive their individual behaviour in groups.
It was these feedback exercises that became notorious amongst
pilots. Typically linear thinkers, many pilots were ill equipped emo-
tionally and psychologically to deal with what felt like an onslaught
of judgemental, personal criticism masked as ‘feedback’ (Bradford et
al., 1964, p. 16) from peers and subordinates. Unfortunately, many par-
ticipants were forever alienated by this approach, creating staunch
critics of the value of this important training.
Cook (1995), a 737 captain, noted that ‘although the developers of
the United CRM program deny it, elements of T-group and sensitivity
training are certainly involved’ (p. 30). Clearly not a supporter of this
training perspective, Cook recounts how ‘during a sales presentation
of the course’ a representative from Scientific Methods ‘explained with
apparent satisfaction how he had witnessed captains and, in one
instance, a chief pilot, break down and cry before the group during the
final evaluation’ (p. 31). Appalled by this ‘personality shredding’,
Cook observed that the ‘difficulty stems from an emphasis on attitudes
and motivations rather than behavior’ (p. 31).
A NEW TEAM RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (TRM) PEDAGOGY
Although many team training programmes adequately address the
first challenge illuminated by the Florida Everglades, Tenerife, and
Portland aircraft accidents by improving communication and empha-
sizing the dangers of non-standard behaviours, few programmes ade-
quately address the second – how to negotiate the dynamics of authority
relationships.
When training does include group dynamics components, it often
reflects the theories and methods of the US-based NTL and their 
T-group and sensitivity training approach. Because most CRM train-
ing programmes have roots in the early model developed in the
United States by Blake and Mouton, this finding is not surprising.
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Little, if any, CRM training has utilized a Tavistock approach to the
analysis of group behaviour originated in the UK in the post-Second
World War period.
In contrast to NTL’s interpersonal perspective, the Tavistock
approach refocuses the level of analysis on covert group processes –
the often unspoken dynamics of authority within the group – and con-
siders authority not as an individual’s characteristics but as patterns of
relationship found in the group as a whole. Rather than relying on
NTL-feedback exercises, which may lead to individual resistance and
perceptions of ‘personality shredding’, the Tavistock approach aims to
expose people to the realities of the messy, conflict-ridden complexity
of group life. This approach provides no easy measures for under-
standing one’s managerial style. Instead, it assumes that groups work
in cyclic, not linear, ways, oscillating from anxiety modes to work
modes and back again, and focuses on heightening the group’s aware-
ness of individual psychology, group dynamics and systemic factors
so that teams can operate more effectively.
One might ask: why does it matter which perspective – NTL, inter-
personal; Tavistock, group-as-a-whole – to employ in team training?
The answer lies in where responsibility is placed – in other words, who
is authorized – to make changes within the system. Are individuals
made to feel personally responsible and defensive, leading to percep-
tions of ‘personality shredding’? Or, as Majors Wilfred Bion and John
Rickman (1943) proposed during their group study at Northfield
Hospital during the Second World War, are team failures seen as a dis-
ability of the community as a whole? (Fraher, 2004b)
Although both the NTL and Tavistock models are based on experi-
ential pedagogy, such as investigating the group as a microcosm of
society, studying behaviour as it occurs in the here-and-now, and pro-
viding opportunities for individuals to interpret their own learning
experience, the two models emphasize distinctly different behaviours
(Fraher, 2004b; Miller, 1993; Neumann et al., 2004). For example, the
pedagogy employed at many current CRM training events is one in
which participants are helped to diagnose and experiment with their
own behaviour and relationships during group learning activities.
More specifically, these NTL-influenced models focus on modifying
an individual’s directly observable behaviours and attitudes through
a variety of feedback exercises (Fraher, 2004b).
In contrast, the Tavistock model’s group relations events provide
opportunities to examine covert, unconscious group behaviours, espe-
cially in relation to authority figures, within a temporary social insti-
tution (Fraher, 2004b; Klein and Astrachan, 1971; Neumann et al.,
2004). This model fosters the study of authority, and the obvious and
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not-so-obvious dynamics that influence the success and failure of lead-
ership efforts, such as the glaring deficiencies illuminated in the pre-
viously discussed aviation mishaps. Understanding authority and
how it influences people’s behaviour in groups must become a central
concept in Team Resource Management (TRM) programmes.
Heightening TRM trainees’ awareness of covert processes at the
group-as-a-whole level would enable them to understand better the
systemic influences on the group’s decision-making capacity, better
preparing them to take responsibility for their behaviour as a group.
Ironically, by focusing on the group’s dynamics and shifting attention
away from the individual, individual leadership capacities are fos-
tered. In other words, increased awareness of the group as a whole
enables trainees to learn to manage themselves in the multiple roles
necessary for contemporary leadership by encouraging critical think-
ing about the covert processes that can influence the success or failure
of leadership efforts.
Although Cook (1995) argued ‘until research results are available,
CRM training should de-emphasize the study of leadership’ (p. 32, italics
added), I disagree. The changed political, social and technical contexts
identified at the beginning of this essay indicate that the time is ripe
for pioneering new leadership and team training practices and con-
ducting research on their effectiveness. In the following section I offer
seven guideposts for the development of a new Tavistock-based team
training model called TRM.
GUIDEPOSTS TO TRM TRAINING DESIGN
Study the organizational culture
TRM should never be considered an off-the-shelf product, equally
applicable to any high-risk industry in any country. In order to pro-
vide effective team training, a TRM programme must respond to the
ethos of the particular organization’s culture. Therefore, TRM should
include a research phase where training developers learn how their
training will integrate within the larger system.
After gathering organizational data through interview, survey and
observation researchers should identify, analyse and discuss safety
related best practices and methods of resistance to their adoption as a
means to understanding the organization’s safety culture. Analysis of
archival documents evaluating systemic trends in safety related acci-
dents and other incidents is also important to understanding the wider
culture and mind-set of training participants. Using data gathered
during the research phase, a TRM programme specifically tailored to
the needs of the organization can then be developed.
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Respect linear thinking
Most professionals in high-risk fields have completed extensive tech-
nical training and assessment programmes, both at the beginning of
their careers and periodically throughout, in which competencies
closely linked to job performance are evaluated. For example, airline
pilots have annual checks in flight simulators, military officers engage
in field exercises and inspections, and many law enforcement profes-
sionals demonstrate weapon prowess on the firing range. These are
important job competencies.
Yet, this technical emphasis can reinforce that there is only one cor-
rect formulaic response to all problems and a specific set of demon-
strable skills individuals should use to address them. Unfortunately,
this is not always the case. Some problems require innovation, cre-
ativity and collaboration, not linear thinking. As evidenced in the
Eastern Airlines crash in the Florida Everglades, at least one crew
member must always have a sense of the bigger picture and not
become overly fixated on the task. Conversely, at least one crew mem-
ber needs to manage the primary task and not become overly con-
cerned with the wider system.3
High-risk professions often attract linear thinkers who are comfort-
able with formulaic responses, further reinforced through technical
training. As a result, developers of TRM programmes should recog-
nize and respect that it may be difficult initially for some participants
to think outside the linear ways to which they are accustomed. For
some participants, urging them to evaluate authority dynamics and
covert group processes is akin to asking them to translate an unfamil-
iar foreign language.
This is not to say that strongly orientated linear thinkers cannot ben-
efit from TRM programmes. On the contrary, they can if training
developers pace events so as not to alienate these participants or leave
them overburdened with what Miller (1989) called ‘awkwardly
shaped lumps of undigested experience’ (p. 25).
Make it accessible and relevant
One way to keep technically-minded, linear-thinking professionals
engaged in TRM is to make the training accessible and relevant to par-
ticipants. This can be accomplished a number of ways. First, consider
recruiting respected staff from within the organization as consultants
in the training programme. This builds trust and develops a natural
buy-in to the legitimacy of the event. Second, include real issues the
organization is currently grappling with and well known examples of
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safety violations from the organization’s past. Third, keep the training
concepts simple and jargon free. Professionals in technical fields are
often suspicious of psychological concepts and overly theoretical dis-
cussions. Even if they initially feel TRM is valuable, research has
shown that if participants are not able to make a clear connection to
application in their daily work life, training quickly loses relevance
(Oser et al., 2001).
Meet participants where they are
To be effective, a Tavistock-method consultant offers opportunities for
member learning by staying in role and managing the boundaries of
time, task and territory (Miller, 1989; Rice, 1965). Less concerned with
social civilities, the consultant confronts the group, without affronting
its members, in order to draw attention to group – not individual –
behaviours (Rice, 1965; Banet and Hayden, 1977).
In this role, the consultant uses his or her own experiences and
observations to make sense of what is going on, in order to offer
hypotheses based on their understanding. Rice (1965) noted, ‘If the
staff cannot learn from experience of their own interpersonal and
intergroup relationships, then it is unlikely that they will be able to
help the member to learn from theirs’ (p. 150). Therefore, for
Tavistock-method consultants to be effective in TRM they must not
only ‘stick to the task and role’ (Miller, 1989, p. 13) they must role
model the learning struggle they are urging for participants.
Pay attention to anxiety
Anxiety is ever present in organizations, especially high-hazard high-
risk environments where mistakes can often lead to accident and
death. This anxiety can trigger primitive fears that in turn lead to the
creation of social defences and anxiety-relieving rituals (Fraher, 2004a;
Gabriel, 1999; Hirshhorn, 1988; Jaques, 1952; Menzies, 1959). Gabriel
(1999) noted ‘successful organizations in [the] future will need mem-
bers whose anxieties are confronted and worked through, rather than
members who look for suitable scapegoats to victimize’ (p. 225). A
TRM training programme based on the Tavistock method can expose
the group’s use of anxieties and social defences in the context of a safe,
contained environment, providing a controlled learning opportunity
for event participants.
Rice (1965) emphasized how important it is that Tavistock-method
consultants meet participants in their learning by demonstrating ‘that
they can contain and understand their own anxieties . . . and through
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this provide opportunities for others to learn as well’ (p. 45). He also
noted, ‘Since one cannot learn much about anxiety without becoming
anxious, members of staff who are not made anxious at some points’ in
a Tavistock-based event ‘are unlikely to be in close enough touch with
what is happening . . . to fill their own roles adequately’ (ibid., p. 45).
Aim to effect systemic change
Although training is important, effecting systemic change is the only
way truly to enhance an organization’s safety culture. Therefore, there
needs to be systemic support for TRM and the perspectives to which
it exposes trainees. Having central organizational leaders such as
Chief Pilots, Fire Chiefs and Police Chiefs involved as role models is
essential to TRM programme success. Participants must feel that
rather than a training vaccination, TRM is an integrated programme
supported by the wider organizational system.
It’s not a group relations conference
No training is a panacea. Although Tavistock theories and methods
can inform many types of team training for groups operating in high-
risk environments where authority dynamics are particularly influen-
tial, designing and consulting to events as if participants are attending
a Tavistock group relations conference will usually end in disappoint-
ment. This is because of the peculiar design of the group relations con-
ference.
A Tavistock-based group relations conference, like the Leicester
Conference, for instance, is a particular learning environment designed
as a social island where participants can experiment with taking up
leadership roles within the temporary organization and its various
sub-systems (Miller, 1989). The goal of the conference, therefore, is for
participants to increase their understanding of ‘the dynamics of leader-
ship and authority relations in groups’ (Banet and Hayden, 1977, 
p. 156) and apply lessons learned to roles that they take in their own
organizations and networks back home (Tavistock Institute, 2002, p. 2).
One reason why this two-week event works so well is that, as inhab-
itants of the social island, participants are free to experiment in rela-
tive safety without fear of losing their job, forfeiting promotion or
ruining their professional reputation. In most cases, participants will
never see fellow Leicester Conference members after the event con-
cludes. Unlike Leicester, most team training is done either within
organizations or professional networks where individuals do have a
high level of concern about professional reputation. Although some
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
201
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
30
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
40
1
2
311
TEAM RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 177
OPUS/5/2 final  10/24/05  12:52 PM  Page 177
aspects of group relations conference design, such as large and small
study groups, can be exported successfully, expecting participants to
engage in the event with the same manner of abandon as a Tavistock
conference is unrealistic.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Recent research about organizational disaster has introduced analysis
of team learning, anxiety and stress management during the incubation
period as a field of study. Yet, most team training models still focus on
prevention through an individual error model, rooted in the out-
moded disaster analysis that focused on the ‘well-meaning’ and ‘gen-
erally competent’ individual and his or her ‘single-flawed decision’ as
the key to understanding disaster. Just as methods for analysis of orga-
nizational disaster have matured to include performance breakdown and
team learning, it is now time to embrace a more holistic approach to
high-risk team training.
By providing one of the first CRM training programmes as a model,
based on NTL’s sensitivity training and their own personality mea-
surements, Blake and Mouton fundamentally shaped the early years
of CRM training. Their influence continues to be felt throughout the
resource management field and personality measures remain a popu-
lar part of many CRM training programmes. Easily reproduced, sta-
tistically valid and reliable, these measures satisfy fantasies that if the
right personalities have been identified and grouped together, the
team will be effective.
Yet, such approaches ignore the fact that people behave differently
in different groups and team dynamics often move in unpredictably
complex – not reliably linear – ways. As a result, increasing people’s
awareness of these often covert, complex authority and group phen-
omena, rather than providing a snapshot of one’s personal managerial
style, remains essential to the development of leaders who can address
the challenges of today’s dynamic new operating environments.
Recent developments in the field indicate a shift away from CRM
training, focused on cognitive knowledge and leadership training,
towards more clearly observable, and therefore measurable, error
management behaviours (Helmreich et al., 1999). This shift will
increase receptivity of CRM concepts within the field of aviation and
other technical, high-risk industries.
However, I contend that CRM should not be thought of simply as a
formulaic error management strategy, but as an emotional intelligence
philosophy that includes both leadership training and error manage-
ment strategies designed to help employees in high-risk industries
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understand the dynamics of authority and learn to think critically.
What is needed are team training programmes based on an under-
standing of the complex impact of individual psychology, group
dynamics, and systemic influences on team behaviour in high-hazard,
high-reliability industries. This paper has offered one way forward in
this endeavor.
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Notes
1. A draft of this article entitled ‘“Training to be Selected”: Estab-
lishing the Case for a New Crew Resource Management Pedagogy’
was presented at The International Society for the Psychoanalytic
Study of Organizations (ISPSO) Symposium, Baltimore, Mary-
land, June 17–19, 2005.
2. Interestingly, Blake attended one of the NTL’s first human labora-
tories held in Bethel, Maine in 1949 while on a Fulbright
Scholarship at the Tavistock Clinic in London, quickly arranging
to spend his next summer in Maine; thus beginning a ten year con-
nection with NTL as Bethel faculty and board member.
3. Thanks to Karen Izod for this important observation.
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